Imperial, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Modernization

Boris N. Mironov * , a

a Saint Petersburg State University, Russian Federation

Abstract
In Russia during the imperial and soviet periods society evolved from tradition to modernity. As a result, advanced industrial technologies emerged, along with the corresponding political, cultural, and social mechanisms that made possible the maintenance, use, and management of these technologies. Imperial modernization followed the classic European scenario. In its goals, means, and results Soviet modernization served as the continuation of this. While Soviet modernization was reminiscent of the classic Western model in some respects (the formation of the rational, educated, secular-minded individual; industrialization; urbanization; the democratization of the family; the emancipation of women and children), it differed from the model in others (the priority of the state over society, the supremacy of the collective over the individual, the restriction of the freedom of the individual, centralization, central planning). In sum, the formula of Soviet modernization amounted to technological and material progress on a foundation of traditional social institutions. Soviet modernization achieved a lower rate of development and came at a higher cost to society than imperial modernization. Nevertheless, were it not for the enormous and utterly unjustifiable human sacrifices, one could consider Soviet modernization successful even though, as had imperial modernization, it ended in crisis and revolution. Soviet modernization succeeded imperial modernization as a result of the armed revolution of 1917, while post-Soviet modernization replaced the Soviet version after the peaceful revolution of 1991–1993, but these facts do not mean that both modernizations never happened, or that they failed.

Imperial modernization encompassed mostly the educated levels of society, the upper strata, a significant share of the urban population, and the part of the peasantry that supported the Stolypin reforms. The population groups enumerated here overlapped to some extent, hence their proportion of the general population barely exceeded 30–35 percent. The lion’s share of the population, living primarily in the countryside, experienced modernization only slightly. Moreover, a significant part of this group reacted to fundamental modernization processes either negatively (such as commercialization and social and material bourgeois differentiation) or with indifference. Soviet modernization involved the entire society, and its effects proved to be deeper and more all-encompassing. Judging by the results of both modernizations, one can consider them fairly successful projects on the whole, although they also did not meet all the challenges and expectations placed upon them.

Post-Soviet modernization also did not resolve all of the old problems and at the same time created many new ones. But it is far from complete and rendering a verdict on it is premature. Nevertheless, it is already possible to say that the political, cultural, and social rapprochement with the West over the last 20 years has been unprecedented in history. And this is natural: convergence had been the main trend in the development of Europe from the 18th to the 20th centuries, and in recent decades has transformed into worldwide globalization.

Keywords: imperial and Soviet modernization, modernization models and strategies, similarities and differences, critiques of modernization assessments, convergence of Russia and the West, Russian path.

* Corresponding author
E-mail addresses: mironov1942@yandex.ru (B.N. Mironov)
1. Introduction

In contemporary literature, the term “modernization” is used in four senses: as (1) the transition from traditional to contemporary society—this is the essence of the concept of modernization; (2) a process in the course of which the stragglers catch up to those who have gone ahead, that is, as a synonym of catch-up development; (3) a transformation undertaken by less developed countries with the goal of coming closer to the characteristics of the most developed; and (4) the development of society in a broad sense through reform and the introduction of innovations. In this article I have in mind the first meaning of the term—as a movement from tradition to modernity (which includes, in varying degrees, all the other interpretations as well). The transition of modernization leads to the emergence and development of advanced industrial technologies, and also the political, cultural, and social mechanisms corresponding to them, which enable the maintenance, use, and management of these technologies. Modernization can be understood as a combination of many processes: industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, professionalization, rationalization, social and political mobilization, democratization, the formation of modern motivational value systems, revolutions in education and communication, and the structural and functional differentiation of society. In other words, modernization is an array of concurrent changes in society, a comprehensive process of innovation that encompasses all spheres of social life and that affects all social institutions and all members of society. Modernization’s criterion of success is ultimately improvement of the quality of life for the majority of the population (Poberezhnikov, 2006; Tikhonova, 2007; Ot agrarnogo obshchestva, 1998; Stearns, 2001; Semenov, 2003).

2. Materials and methods

The author analytically summarizes the existing literature on the question of Russian modernization using the comparative historical method, based on the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity, and a systematic approach, and draws conclusions about the characteristics of modernization in the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods of its history.

3. Discussion and results

3.1. Imperial Modernization

In Russia, the transition from traditional to modern society occurred in the period of the empire—indeed, this is what we call modernization. Imperial modernization can be divided into two stages: (1) the eighteenth to the first half of the nineteenth century, and (2) the second half of the nineteenth century to 1917. The beginning of the industrial revolution, which in all countries is associated with the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, i.e., the beginning of modernization, in Russia dates from 1830 to 1850. At the center of the first stage, labeled preliminary or protomodernization, was the development of industry, cities, education, the bureaucratic apparatus, domestic and foreign trade, and infrastructure. This development occurred in the form of a transfer of Western European institutions and technical and cultural achievements. The successes were modest, but they established the preconditions for the beginning of real modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s provided a powerful impetus for continuing modernization, which from this point became truly deep and multidimensional, despite the fierce resistance of tradition and the vacillation in government policy. In the second stage, the processes that achieved distinctive development included industrialization in the form of an industrial revolution, professionalization, secularization, individualization, the proliferation of means of mass communication, the growth of social and professional mobility, the demographic transition, the family revolution, nation building—and particularly important—the development of private property (privatization), constitutionalism, and civil society.

The development of the country in the Imperial period proceeded as if according to a scenario written specifically for Russia by theorists of modernization: (1) an industrial and market economy developed, based on competition and private property; (2) civil society emerged, including a large number of voluntary civic organizations; (3) a constitutional state took shape with a parliament, the rule of law, openness, transparency, and publicity; (4) an industrial and urban way of life evolved, based on the functional specialization of institutions and individuals (referring to the division of labor, professionalization, the bureaucratization of administration and so on); (5) the Russian nation developed into a body of people united by their own will, which identified itself with the whole and was conscious of its unity; (6) the family evolved in the direction of the small, democratic family with equality between the spouses, parents, and children; (7) the modern personality formed, which accepted change as the norm, civil and political rights as an attribute of man, a market economy and private property as necessary conditions to ensure the normal functioning of society on the foundation of reason of science; and (8) a secular system of values was affirmed, in which individualism was a second religion, based on social and individual success. Russian society from the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century progressed from tradition to modernity, but by 1917, because of the incompleteness of modernization, not one of the criteria of contemporary society was fully met (Mironov with Ekoľ, 2000a; Mironov with Ekoľ, 2000b; Mironov, 2018a; Mironov, 2018b; Mironov, 2018c).

Three circumstances account for the similarity of the actual and theoretical development (that is, as they correspond to the theory of modernization) of scenarios for imperial Russia: the country’s natural,
spontaneous attraction to a European trajectory; the desire of the elite to follow a pan-European path; and the policy of the ruling class of consciously and persistently pursuing the goal of catching up with the most advanced European countries in all respects. It is important to keep in mind that quiet and unhurried Westernization began long before Peter I. It manifested itself in the borrowing of everyday objects from the “Germans,” in the strengthening of cultural, economic, and personal contacts between Russia and the Western countries, in the emergence in the seventeenth century of the so-called German Settlement in Moscow, and in the increase of the total number of immigrants from Western Europe (which reached approximately 2500 people in the 1690s) (Orlenko, 2004: 52; Kovrigina, 1998). The task of modernization set by the government was gradually realized. In this connection, the influence of Western countries was not one-sided. Russia also taught a few things to its teachers. Russian music, literature, art, and ballet enriched world culture, and Russian scholars enriched world science. A.A. Petsko attempted to systematize scientific information on the major Russian achievements from ancient times to the present day. He identified more than a thousand achievements of world-class significance, including 112 geographical discoveries, approximately 400 inventions, 176 firsts in aerospace, about 400 scientific achievements (including scientific discoveries, the establishment of theories, systems, and doctrines, and the discovery of laws), more than 200 firsts in the creation of breakthrough technologies and other areas. Among these are the decimal principle of cash accounting, D. I. Mendeleev’s periodic table of chemical elements, the caterpillar tractor, the alternating current generator, the low-tillage (bezotval’nyi) system of soil cultivation, Sputnik, and so on (Petsko, 2012). Russia was neither a submissive student desiring only to please her mentor, nor a monkey who did not know what to do with a pair of glasses, as some researchers think (Kingston-Mann, 1991).

The Russians adopted what was useful and necessary to them, but did not blindly copy Western models and did not lose their national identity, although they did remain within the framework of European culture. Russia’s civilizational uniqueness, in the sense of some cultural-national features that are not susceptible to the influence of time is, in my opinion, a myth. Russia constantly changed. Like it or not, “you cannot step into the same river twice,” as a wise man said two and a half thousand years ago.

In the second stage of imperial modernization a breakthrough in development occurred, as a result of which there was a real economic miracle. From 1861 to 1913, the pace of economic development was comparable with that of Europe. National income in this period increased 3.8-fold. And this occurred despite the enormous natural increase in the population of the empire, which grew by almost 2 million people annually. From the 1880s, the tempo of economic growth quickened: gross national income increased by 3.3 percent yearly. Industry demonstrated the greatest success. From 1881 to 1913, Russian’s share of world industrial production grew from 3 to 5 percent. However, agriculture progressed at a Central European pace. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, Russia was one of the most dynamically developing nations in the world (Gregori, 2003: 61–62). But the chief miracle consisted of the fact that during this high rate of economic growth and growth of the population there was a significant increase in living standards. I will point out twelve of the most important features that demonstrate this process in the post-reform period (Mironov, 2009a; Mironov, 2012a: 213, 216, 337, 372–73, 429, 529–39, 547, 598–609, 629–30).

1 The rise in the real daily wage of the agricultural worker by 3.8 times, and the industrial worker by 1.4 times, from the 1850s to 1911–1913.

2 The increase in the production of consumer goods and the turnover of internal trade per capita in constant prices by 1.7 times from 1885 to 1913 (earlier information is not available).

3 The increase in quantities of grain left for the peasants’ own consumption by 34 percent between the periods of 1886–1890 and 1911–1913.

4 A decrease in the number of a peasant farmer’s working days per year, from 135 in the 1850s to 107 in 1902, and a reduction in the number of hours clocked by workers from 2953 in the 1850s to 2570 in 1913.

5 Peasants’ large-scale purchase of land. From 1862 to 1910, peasants bought 24.5 million dessiatines of land, paying for this the huge sum of 971 million rubles, which is 28 times greater than all the arrears they had accumulated by 1910. Allotment land that had been deeded to its owner consisted of 6.8 percent in 1877, 14.5 percent in 1887 and 21.6 percent in 1910, and for all privately held land, corresponding figures of 6.2, 13.1, and 35 percent; moreover, almost half (46%) of land was purchased by peasant communes and associations.

6 A rise in Russians’ deposits in the state savings bank—the most popular bank in Russia. In the fifty provinces of European Russia between the periods of 1865–1869 and 1909–1913, the number of depositors increased 159-fold; per thousand residents 82-fold; the amount per depositor 2.7-fold; taking inflation into account, 1.7-fold; increase in the holdings per inhabitant of the country, 228-fold; taking inflation into account, 145-fold. Bank depositors were divided into professional groups, among whom the “workers” stood out. To this last group belonged those employed in agriculture and industry, that is, they included a majority of peasants and workers. Their share among bank customers grew from 9 percent in 1865–1869 to 33 percent in 1909–1913, while their share of deposits grew from 11 to 33 percent in the same period. In 1913

For example, in Kingston-Mann’s opinion, Russia generally adopted bad things from bad neighbors, as a consequence of which it followed the model of “forced modernization” from Peter to the Bolsheviks and further to Yeltsin, continually ignoring models of development that were more suitable and more humane.
their number reached 7.6 million, among whom women accounted from around 43% and men 57%. If we accept that men represented the entire family, then it turns out that around 4.3 million families, including 26 million people (given that the average family contained 6 people), kept money in savings banks, that is, 21 percent of the population of European Russia. Savings banks held only part of “workers’” capital: many peasants kept money at home; and in addition to savings banks, there were also other credit institutions.

(7) A significant and systematic increase in the full height of men (that is, once they had reached physical maturity) by 7.7 cm (from 161.3 cm to 169 cm) between 1791 and 1915, and an increase in their weight of 7.4 kg (from 59.1 to 66.5) between 1811 and 1915, affirms that the peasant standard of living did indeed increase. The body mass index, which indicates the level of nutrition, complied with the norm throughout the period of 1811 to 1915, and at its end even rose slightly—from 21.8 to 23.3 (Mironov, 1995; Mironov, 1999; Mironov, 2007; Mironov, 2012b: 453–462).

(8) A decrease in the number of suicides (per 100,000) among the rural population between 1870–1874 and 1906–1910 by 10 percent. Among the urban population, suicide grew by 20 percent.

(9) Average life expectancy increased by 7 years (from 27 to 34) from 1851–1863 to 1904–1913.

(10) The average level of literacy for those ten years and older grew from 17 to 43 percent.

(11) The human development index increased 1.8-fold—from 0.171 to 0.208—which takes into account (a) life expectancy; (b) level of education (literacy and the share of those school-age children enrolled in school); and (c) GDP per capita.

(12) The widespread opinion that material inequality had grown enormously by 1917 is not confirmed empirically. In the early twentieth century the decile coefficient of inequality (the ratio of the average income of the richest 10 percent to the average income of the poorest 10 percent) amounted only to 6 and was significantly lower than in the most developed European countries of the time. For example, in England it was 50, and in the USA, 20. In contemporary Russia inequality is 2.5 times higher than it was 100 years ago. In the USSR in 1991 the decile coefficient was slightly lower than in tsarist Russia—4 to 5.

The given data (considering moderate property differentiation) clearly indicate that the prosperity of the people increased in the post-reform period. Due to the fact that the level of material inequality in Russia was a third of that of the US, the standard of living of the vast majority of country’s population did not differ as much as is sometimes thought.

Progress could be observed in all spheres of life. The social structure of society in the post-reform period underwent a radical, but peaceful transformation. Thanks to the reforms of the 1860s, the estates began to lose their particular privileges, they became more similar in legal position, and they gradually transformed into classes and professional groups. The landed nobility merged into a single social-professional group with private landowners, noble officials merged with non-noble officials, and other categories of personal and hereditary nobility merged with the professional intelligentsia. The clergy evolved from an estate in the direction of a professional group of pastors. The urban estates transformed into entrepreneurs and intelligentsia, and the workers and peasantry into farmers and workers. The legal and factual elimination of the privileges of the nobility, on the one hand, and the abolition of the legal inferiority of the taxed estates, on the other, was of decisive significance in the transformation of estates into classes and professional groups. With the abolition of serfdom in 1861, all categories of peasants and urban inhabitants became equal in rights, and the nobility lost its chief privilege—the exclusive right to possess serfs. After the introduction of the zemstvos in 1864, all estates had the right to form organs of local self-government at the district and provincial levels. The urban reform of 1870 changed self-government by the urban estate into all-estate self-government. As a result of the judicial reform in 1864, the estate courts were abolished, and all citizens came under the jurisdiction of a single court. The introduction of universal conscription in 1874 eliminated the principal difference between the privileged and the taxed estates: representatives of all classes, including the nobility, began to be enlisted in compulsory military service on the same basis. Other important reforms that took place in the last third of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century (the abolition of the poll tax and collective responsibility among village and city residents, the inclusion of the nobility among the taxpayers, the elimination of the passport regime, the cancellation of redemption payments for land, receiving the right to leave the commune in 1907, and finally, the introduction of representative institutions and the acquisition of civil rights for the entire population in 1905) led to the fact that by 1917 all estates had legally lost their specific estate privileges. Upward social mobility increased substantially, supporting the transformation from an estate-based social structure to one based on classes and professions.

The political development of the country after the great reforms should also be acknowledged as quite successful. The Russian state evolved from an autocracy to a constitutional monarchy and became such in 1905–1906. After 1905 a free press appeared, as did public opinion, political parties, and thousands of voluntary associations—all components of a civil society. Basically a mechanism formed that ensured the communication of public sentiments, desires, and demands from society to the power structures, and control over their implementation though legislative institutions, the press, public opinion, and voluntary associations. The latter of these were numbered at approximately 90,000 by the autumn of 1917. Bourgeois voluntary associations gained strength. Dozens of exchange societies, congresses of industrialists, societies of manufacturers and factory owners lobbied the state and the workers on behalf of regional and sector-specific entrepreneurial concerns (Mironov, 2008; Mironov, 2009b; Mironov, 2018c: 841–47).
To emphasize: in the post-reform period, from 1861 to 1914, the prosperity of Russian citizens increased, and not only in a narrow material sense. The entire population, including underprivileged social groups, acquired civil and political rights and access to education and other benefits of civilization. As is well-known, in modernization theory the improvement of living conditions is considered to be the main criterion of success (Tiryakian, 1985). Because imperial Russia modernized, and in so doing, the well-being of the population grew, modernization should be considered a success, despite the costs, the difficulties, and the periodic crises.

The overthrow of the monarchy is incorrectly seen as an indication of the failure of imperial modernization. First, revolution in the face of the unquestionable success of modernization is not nonsense, but a sociological law. The theory of modernization affirms: modernization contributes to the growth of social tensions and conflicts in society; the more quickly and successfully modernization proceeds, as a rule, the higher the level of conflict and social tension in society. In Russia, as in other countries at the second echelon of modernization, its accelerated, and in some cases even premature growth came at great cost and even required sacrifices—for example from landowners who had their land forcibly expropriated by the government, although with compensation. This led to hardship and trials for specific groups of Russians and did not immediately bring equal prosperity to everyone. The collateral negative consequences of modernization turned out to be great—an increase in social and interethnic tensions, conflicts, violence, deviance in all its manifestations—from suicide to social and political protest. The extraordinary growth of every kind of protest movement generated, first, disorientation, disorganization, and social tensions in society; second, an acquired freedom, the weakening of social controls and the growth of social mobility; and third, a discrepancy between people’s needs and the objective possibilities of the economy and society to satisfy them. Society has experienced the so-called trauma of social change, or the anomic of success. “In essence, progressive changes having positive results reveal their negative side precisely because they are changes that disrupt an established, stable order; they interrupt continuity, upset the equilibrium, they place in doubt or invalidate the meaning of former skills and habits” (Shtompka, 2005: 474, 491). The conflict of tradition and modernity might be called a systemic crisis. However, this crisis has nothing in common with the understanding of systemic crisis that dominated Soviet historiography and even now exists widely in contemporary literature—as a general and permanent crisis that transformed the Russian socium into an untenable and unsustainable system that was not able to develop and adapt to changing conditions of life and to provide for the welfare of its citizens. “The decline of the old, prompted by the growth of the new and young—this is the mark of health” (Ortega-i-Gasset, 2003: 123). The crisis of Russian society was a case of growing pains, which testified to its development, but not to the approach of its end, “imagining itself as mutation and transformation, rather than decline” (Le Goff 2005: 6). The crisis did not lead inexorably to revolution, but only created the preconditions for it; the possibility only became reality due to particular circumstances—military defeats, the difficulties of wartime and the relentless and bitter struggles for power between the public opposition and the monarchy.

Second, the fruits of modernization: educated cadres, culture, libraries, schools, universities, industry, railways, and so on—were not lost, although they were substantially affected.

Third, Soviet modernization was based on the achievements of imperial modernization and implemented projects that it had not carried out, essentially continuing imperial modernization.

3.2. Soviet Modernization

Industrialization, the development of infrastructure, and the improvement of the population’s educational level were at the forefront of imperial modernization, and Soviet industrialization was a continuation of imperial modernization.

On the eve of the First World War, Russia entered a new phase of economic modernization. After long discussions, the government formulated a program of financial-economic reform, designed to carry out a “radical transformation” of the economy. Its author—A.V. Krivoshein (1857–1921), a colleague of P.A. Stolypin and a leader of his reform, was head of land management and agriculture. The program was called the “New Course,” and its actual implementation was entrusted to the new head of the Treasury Department, P. L. Bark. The aim of the course was to reorient the state budget from income from the sale of vodka (which contributed 26% of state income in 1913) to income from the development of natural resources and from accelerating the development of productive forces. The course envisioned an increase in investment in the national economy and a restoration of the balance between agriculture and industry. This was an attempt to find a compromise between the agrarians, who insisted on the priority of government support for the development of agriculture, and entrepreneurs, who sought the government’s preferential attention to the development of industry and trade (Diakin, 1988: 178–219; Kulikov, 2017: 25–32; Sysoeva, 2000: 215–45; Shepelev, 1987: 162–73).

P. L. Bark formulated the principles of the “New Course” in his speech before the deputies of the Fourth State Duma on April 22, 1914 (Gosudarstvennaya duma, 1914: 807–26).

---

1 Le Goff put it thus in regard to the crisis of the West in the late Middle Ages.
(1) A gradual decrease in budget revenues from the liquor monopoly, compensating for the loss of income by the introduction of an income tax, an increase in estate taxes, a stamp duty and some other duties and fees, and an increase in the price of wine.

(2) An upgrade in the productive forces of the country by means of properly supplied and available credit. A number of measures were stipulated for its development—reform of the Petersburg exchange, the organization of an Agricultural Bank, the planned construction of a network of grain elevators, the revision of the charter of the State Bank in order to strengthen its independence, increasing the number of its local offices, and the expansion of credit cooperatives.

(3) The development and improvement of means of communication, primarily the railroads, which were to be built not only with public funds but also by private capital, and also roads and waterways.

(4) The “New Course” envisioned the implementation of major construction projects. In 1914 the government approved a widespread reclamation program over the course of five years, 1915–1922, involving the construction of irrigation facilities for cotton in the Golodna Steppe in Turkestan, in the Mugansk and Miłsk steppes in the Caucasus, a system for irrigation in the Lower Volga basin, draining land in the Upper Volga, in the lower Dniester and Danube, in Tomsk and Tobolsk provinces and in the Far East, as well as field surveys in several areas. In European Russia they anticipated the draining of 200,000 dessiatines, as well as measures for the battle with sand and erosion. In order to encourage the work of land reclamation, the decision was taken to found a bank for short-term loans and to tie in the Noble and Peasant banks with the issuance of reclamation loans (Diakin, 1997: 321, 329–330, 337). The war interrupted the discussion of this draft in the State Duma.

A large-scale plan for the construction of railroads, networks of grain elevators, and large hydroelectric and electric power projects was prepared (Krivoshin, 2002: 176–177, 178–179, 179–180). Russian engineers developed several of these projects, among them the project for the construction of a hydroelectric plant on the river Volkov, developed by G. O. Graftio. Preparatory work began in 1917, but it was suspended as a result of the revolution. I. A. Rozov, L. V. Iurievich, and B. A. Bakhmet’ev were responsible for the construction project Dneprog (the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station). In June 1914 the project was approved by the State Duma and submitted for approval to the State Council. The war interfered with its realization, as well as the construction of the Volga-Don and Belomor–Baltic canals, the famous Turksib—the chief construction project of the First Five-Year Plan—and others. A plan to construct a deep, Trans-Ural waterway that would connect the Volga River via the Kama and Chusovaia rivers with the Ob-Yenisei Canal has still not been realized (Shakhovskoi, 1952: 28–35). Other projects, developed before the revolution but not carried out for various reasons, were often fulfilled in the Soviet period.

A. V. Krivoshein, the author of the “New Course,” hoped that 1914 would be “the beginning of a new surge of growth in the national economy,” because the “New Course” coincided with the implementation of a whole series of measures and the completion of a whole range of processes whose fruits would ripen in the near future and would automatically replace the current rapid rate of economic development with one that was even more intense (Krivoshin, 2002: 179). In particular, the “New Course” would assure the completion of the Stolypin reforms. We should note that even the war did not interfere with the beginning of the implementation of the “New Course.” The government discontinued trade in alcoholic products on July 19, 1914, and as planned, the losses to the budget were covered by the imposition of new fees and taxes and an increase in some existing ones, as well as by the introduction of an income tax on April 6, 1916. The Stolypin reform continued until the overthrow of the monarchy.

“Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” was repeated in all sorts of contexts during the Soviet years. It is forgotten that the ambitious project to electrify Russia, called GOELRO in 1920, began to be implemented in 1887 and continued at a very rapid tempo and right up to 1914, thanks to the phenomenal growth of investment in the “electrical” sector—on average 20 to 25 percent per year. The first major electric energy plants, justly called a great achievement of Soviet power, were designed before 1913, but the First World War and the revolution interrupted their realization, as a consequence of which they were put into effect much later than planned.

The development of infrastructure was the second important aspect of imperial modernization, and here Soviet authorities continued the work of the tsarist government. Over the course of forty-three years, from 1874 to 1917, the length of the railways increased from 18,100 kilometers (17,000 versts) to 70,300 kilometers (within the borders of the USSR as of 1960)—or by 52,200 kilometers. Over the course of another forty-three years, from 1918 to 1961, the USSR constructed approximately the same amount—56,800 kilometers (Statisticheskii vremennik, 1886: 230; Narodnoe khozyaistvo, 1962: 476). However, if we consider the type of investments made in the tsarist period and the number of people who worked in the construction of the railroad, then the laurels must be given to the empire.

Many believe that Soviet power was responsible for the educational revolution. In fact, May 3, 1908, when the State Duma passed a law on the gradual introduction of universal compulsory primary education, can be considered the date of its beginning. The war interfered with its implementation. I should note the realism and thoroughness of this project, spread out over ten years and with the support of state funding. And without the bustle and haste, without the sacrifices and emergencies that were so characteristic of the Soviet educational revolution, when the state set the task of teaching people to read and write at illiteracy liquidation centers in seven months. Having developed literacy in such a short time, people often quickly
forgot what they had learned, since it was not used in everyday life. A census of the population in 1926 found that literacy was not possessed by 100 percent of people older than nine years (as the Soviet educational revolution suggested)—but only 51 percent of the population, and this is after seven years of struggle against illiteracy. Millions of people, if indeed they learned to read and write, forgot how; the effort and money expended in vain. The fact that in the first post-revolutionary decade, 1917–1926, the literacy of the population of European Russia of both sexes aged ten and older grew by 8 percentage points (from 43 to 51%), which was exactly the same as in the last prerevolutionary decade (from 35 to 43%), when it grew naturally, also testifies to the low level of effectiveness of the campaign to battle illiteracy (Mironov, 1991; Mironov, 2018c: 482, 488). The compulsory introduction to education had modest results. Only those who actually need it at a given moment acquire literacy. The rest lose it. This is a clear example of the ineffectiveness of undertaking the most beneficial reform if it is carried out against people’s will, either forcibly or because it does not respond to the current needs of the population.

In some of its aspects, Soviet modernization differed from the classical Western model (the priority of state over society, the primacy of the collective over the individual, the restriction on individual freedom, centralization, planning), but in others it resembled it (the formation of a rational, educated, secularly oriented individual; industrialization; urbanization; democratization of the family; emancipation of women and children). In short, the formula for Soviet modernization has been confined to technological and material progress based on traditional social institutions. Not forgetting that every generalization schematizes reality, we can say that for a time, the entire country evolved into a large community that in the main acted on its principles.

If we compare the fundamental principles on which communal life in the Russian countryside was constructed before 1917 and Soviet society in the Stalin period, then we can detect similarities between the two. To express the principles of communal life in Soviet terms: (1) collective ownership; (2) the right to work, which the commune guaranteed to every adult male, who received from it the temporary use of a plot of land; (3) the right to rest, not less than 123 days a year, including 52 Sundays, 30 church and state holidays, and 41 local holidays, when it was forbidden to work under fear of punishment; (4) the right to social assistance for the poor, elderly, friendless, and also those who had fallen on hard times as a result of fire, the loss of livestock, and other extraordinary circumstances; (5) democratic centralism, or the subordination of the minority to the majority; (6) collective responsibility: one for all and all for one; (7) the right to participate in public affairs: heads of families took part in assemblies, sat on the peasant court, held public office—importantly, through election, but incidentally, by turns; (8) equality, that is the absence of significant material and social differentiation; (9) the regulation of life, the right of the commune to intervene in the affairs of the peasants, including family affairs if they came into conflict with the interests of the community or with tradition and custom; (10) the approximation of rights and duties: the right to work, rest, participate in public affairs, and to assistance was at the same time a duty to work, rest, be occupied with public affairs, and to help the needy. As one can see, life in Soviet Russia, both in the village and in the city, was established on principles characteristic of the prerevolutionary Russian commune, as a result of which the social structure of Russian steelmaking communities were reproduced in many ways on an all-union scale (Mironov, 1985; Mironov, 2018c: 200–248).

In this case we have an example of historical camouflage, when the appearance does not reveal the essence, but hides it. The entire country turned into a large commune, but was called a socialist society. The historical continuity between the atheist Soviet government, which outwardly broke with the past, and the Orthodox empire is apparent. Paradoxically, representation of the masses determined the structure of Soviet society, proving the point that the state lives “under the brutal power of the masses” (Ortega-i-Gasset, 2003: 48). It isn’t that the state is a servant of the people, fully subordinate to them, but that the independence of the government has limits, which are defined by collective ideas. The convergence of the principles upon which socialist society was built with traditional principles of communal living that had been established for centuries provided for the relative success of socialist modernization.

The results of Soviet modernization turned out to be mixed. On the one hand, individualism, the bourgeoisie, private property, and the free market were understood negatively; they at first tried to “socialize” the family, then to “nationalize” it; various productive organizations such as the kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and state-owned enterprises revived communal forms of social life; at the same time the paternalistic state and its traditional hegemony were reconstructed and the regime was sacralized. On the other hand, significant progress was observed in many areas. The state essentially completed the industrialization of the economy. The domestic economy was separated from production, and the technical side of industry reached its current level. The secularization of the popular consciousness surpassed all Western standards. The motivation for behavior became rational, the system of values became fully secular and in some respects approached the Western model. The demographic transition was completed, freeing women from the heavy burden of bearing children who were doomed to die quickly. The contemporary type of small family, in which the spouses have equal rights and the children are freed of their servile status, developed further. Women achieved juridical equality with men and quickly realized this equality in fact. The social structure of society acquired a modern form, social mobility reached a high level, and classes became open. Society as a whole became more open to the influence of contemporary Western ideas, values, and norms of behavior. Urbanization accelerated. The country became predominantly urban; correspondingly, people reoriented.
themselves en masse toward the values of urban consumer culture. In urban areas the commune was not restored, and as the proportion of the urban population increased steadily and reached 74 percent of the Russian Federation by 1990, the very process of urbanization automatically led to the fact that the population moved from communal to social forms of organization. However, even in the village communal relations were becoming obsolete. A developed social sphere was created, including pensions, health care, the protection of childhood and motherhood, and so on. The state established a modern system of primary, secondary, and higher education, thanks to which considerable successes were achieved in the intellectual spheres of science, literature, and the arts. The USSR changed legally into a confederation, and non-Russian peoples had greater opportunities for national development. The majority of Russian and foreign researchers agree with this assessment (Vishnevskii, 1998; Riazanov, 1997; Semenov, 1993; Kholms, 1994; Black, 1966: 92–123; Fitzpatrick, 1982; Russian and Western Civilization, 2003). In many, although not in all aspects, Soviet Russia began to belong to the space of contemporary culture rather than that of the developing countries. The weak point of Soviet modernization was in political relations. Political modernization greatly increased vertical social mobility, in which the mass of the population was engaged, and brought to power a new elite that was democratic in its origins. However, the constitution and the representative organs of power created by it were progressive in name only and mainly served a decorative function, human rights were limited, and political freedoms were permitted only “in the interests of socialism.” The state did not become truly based on law, and society did not become truly civil—social organizations were managed from above.

If it were not for its huge and unjustifiable human cost, Soviet modernization could be considered successful in its economic results, although as with imperial modernization, it ended in crisis and revolution—the reforms of the early 1990s may be considered a bourgeois revolution in Russia. However, all of the institutions, entities, and ideas at some point exhausted their possibilities and perished. This is a normal process and does not indicate the fundamental inadequacy of these institutions, entities, and ideas. Collective will, the concentration of forces and means, readiness to sacrifice personal for public interests bore fruit over the long term. Successes continued until the resources of collectivism, communalism, centralization, planning, and national enthusiasm were exhausted. At the same time, the implementation of the Soviet model of modernization created a new asymmetry between the individual, the family, society, and the state. In the end, the small democratic family developed rational, educated, demanding, and secular-oriented personalities who aligned poorly with collective property, total regulation, limits on initiative, a lack of civil and political freedoms, the communality of social institutions, and paternalistic government. During the mid-1980s the social, economic, and political crisis came to a head, which was resolved not by civil war, but by reforms that caused change so deep it was the equivalent of a revolution. The reforms were meant to restore harmony between the individual, the family, social institutions, property, and the state, that is, to readjust the social system. However, the balance has not been achieved, as the Russian experience of the 18th to the 20th centuries has shown, because systemic transformations demands two or three generations, that is, approximately 50 to 80 years. From a historical point of view this is a short time, but from the point of view of those who have fallen under the wheel of these changes, it is very long—the entirety of an individual life.

**Convergence of Russia and the West**

Imperial Russia evolved and changed more quickly than its Western neighbors, so the gap between them narrowed in all respects. Due to a lack of data appropriate for making comparisons, it is difficult to assess the reduction of the lag in level of development between them. However, by all accounts Muscovite Rus’ in the 17th century differed from the contemporaneous West to a much greater degree than Russia at the beginning of the 20th century differed from the modern West.

The Soviet Union also developed more quickly than its Western neighbors, so that the gap or lag between the West and the USSR, in terms of material culture, decreased. A very tentative estimate of the lag based on two dates—1913 and 1989—demonstrates this convincingly. The following table shows the calculation of the lag in 1913 (see table 1).

**Table 1.** Lag in the level of development between Russia and the great powers according to 13 indicators from 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>European Russia in 1913</th>
<th>Year in which the level of 1913 Russia was reached*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Gross national product per capita</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Life expectancy in years</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>1800-**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The method of assessing such a lag is to determine the year when the four most advanced of the great powers reached the level of Russia in 1913. The difference between 1913 and this date demonstrated the size of the lag. For example, in 1913 the Russian gross national product per capita was equal to 61 US dollars. The average lag for the four countries in GNP was 113 years. It follows that in 1913, in level of GNP, Russia lagged behind the world's four leading countries by approximately 113 years.

We can measure the lag for each indicator and each country with this method, and then calculate the average gap between Russia and each individual country, and Russia and all four countries together. We obtain the following results: in 1913, in comparison with the world's leading countries, the lag in development across 11 indicators was approximately 100 years. Since the lag between Western countries and the early Russian state was around 300 to 400 years at the dawn of Russian statehood, we can assume that over the course of 1,000 years it was substantially reduced. In terms of the three criteria included in the human development index (nos. 1–3), the difference amounted to 132 years, and according to five of the indicators (nos. 4–8), intensive development obtained from the second half of the 19th century, when the difference amounted to 71 years—indicating a growth in receptivity toward innovation. Comparisons between countries show that until 1913, according to 11 indicators, Great Britain was ahead of Russia by a maximum gap of 113 years, and the between the USA, Germany and France on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, the gap was approximately 89–96 years. The lag with other European countries was smaller or even completely absent.

Due to a lack of relevant data and difficulties in accounting, the calculation did not include such important indicators of the international rating of the countries as the level of development of market relations, democracy, and civil society; the quality of life, satisfaction with life, or level of happiness. The differences in these indicators were substantial. For example, an estate-based representative body appeared in England in 1265 (an elected parliament with advisory functions, mainly concerned with the authorization

| 3. Education, lag in years**** | - | 1724 | 1749 | 1774 | 170 |
| 4. Number of doctors per 10,000 persons | 1.8 | 1850– | 1850– | 1850– | 1850– | 63 |
| 5. Number of children per 1,000 of population | 59 | 1800– | 1800– | 1800– | 113 |
| 6. Number of copies of newspapers per 1,000 of population | 21 | 1840– | 1840+ | 1840+ | 73 |
| 7. Length of railway per 1,000 km² of territory | 12.0 | 1841 | 1881 | 1853 | 55 |
| 8. Number of postal shipments per capita | 15.2 | 1860 | 1870 | 1860 | 51 |
| 9. Urban population, % | 15.3 | 1750– | 1850 | 1800– | 1800– | 113 |
| 10. Literacy, %***** | 29 | 1650 | 1700– | 1700– | 213 |
| 12. Length of paved and unpaved roads per 1000 km² | 19 | 1800– | 1800– | 1800– | 113 |
| 13. Population density in persons per km² | 24.4 | 1500 | 1970+ | 1750– | 233 |

| Lag in years |
| Indicators 1–3 | - | 155 | 138 | 113 | 122 | 132 |
| Indicators 4–8 | - | 75 | 65 | 72 | 72 | 71 |
| Indicators 1–2, 4–12 | - | 118 | 91 | 95 | 94 | 100 |

Notes:
* The sign “–” after the year means that the level in Russia of 1913 was achieved earlier than this year, and “+”—later.
** Median lag between Russia and the four countries.
*** In 1913 US dollars.
**** Education includes literacy and number of students per 1,000 of population.
*****Age 9–15 and older.
of taxes by vote), in France in 1302 (as the Estates-General with similar roles), in the German principalities in the 13th century (as the Landtag with the same sort of functions), and in Russia in 1549 (as the Zemskii Sobor with consultative and legislative duties), respectively 284, 247, and 249 years later than the others (assuming 1300 as the approximate year of the appearance of estate-based representative institutions in the German principalities, a median of 260). It is apparent that by 1913 the institution of private property, a full-fledged market as the regulator of economic relations, a democratic mechanism for functioning, and the renewal of power and civil society had developed in Russia, although it was not yet fully formed.

In the Soviet period the gap between Russia and the great powers narrowed even more. By 1989 the lag in terms of 11 indicators (1–2, 4–12) was reduced from 100 years to 42 years (by 58 years); the lag in the four indicators belonging to the human development index (nos. 1–4) had decreased from 132 years to 24 years (by 108 years). In the five indicators that developed especially in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries (nos. 4–8), the gap lessened from 71 to 29 years (by 42 years). The lag in the level of education and number of doctors disappeared completely (table 2).

Table 2. Lag in the level of development between the USSR and the great powers according to 16 indicators from 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>European Russia in 1989</th>
<th>Year when the level of Russia in 1989 was reached*</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Median lag, in years**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Life expectancy in years</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Education****</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>No lag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Number of doctors per 10,000 of population</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>No lag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Children of school age who are studying, %</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>No lag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Number of copies of newspapers per 1,000 persons</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1987+</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Length of railway per 1,000 km²</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Number of postal shipments per capita</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Urban population, %</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Literacy, %*****</td>
<td>98*****</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Grain yield, in centners per hectare</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Length of paved roads per 1,000 km²</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1910-</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1910-</td>
<td>1910-</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Population density, persons per square kilometer</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>2005+</td>
<td>1800-</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Number of televisions per 1,000 people</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Number of students per 10,000 people</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1987+</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lag, years

| Indicators 1–3 | - | 19 | 29 | 23 | 26 | 24 |
| Indicators 4–8 | - | 34 | 33 | 25 | 25 | 29 |
As we can see, tremendous progress was achieved in the Soviet period, thanks to which the Soviet Union drew closer to the advanced Western European countries in material-organizational relationships and in terms of human and cultural capital. But modernization had not been completed by the end of the Soviet period, primarily in terms of material-organizational and cultural spheres. Indeed, it could not have been completed: the aim of Soviet modernization was not to develop a market economy, civil society, the rule of law, and the creation of the individual personality. The continuation of modernization required a change in the model and the formulation of a course of development that would, on the one hand, preserve the major achievements of the modernization of the Soviet period, and on the other would develop social groups, social mechanisms and institutions that did not currently exist in the Soviet Union but that would be sufficient to make post-Soviet Russia a fully modern society.

However, the people as a whole were so changed, that it did not require a civil war for the Soviet political system to transform radically in the early 1990s.

It should be noted that from 1917 to the beginning of the 1990s the rapprochement between Russia and the West proceeded from both parties. Russia became an urban, industrial, secular, and educated society. The West, although also evolving in the direction of liberal democracy and a market economy, nevertheless absorbed the ideas of a regulated economy, the social state or welfare state, the practice of the ideological indoctrination of the population and of total control, and many other instances of Soviet know-how.

Some spheres of life have regressed in the post-Soviet period: from 1990 to 2000, according to the Human Development Index, Russia has fallen from 26th to 66th place out of 177 countries; the Index decreased from .920 to .662 due to reduced GDP and reduced life expectancy. In the 2000s the Index began to rise and by 2013 had reached .788, thanks to which Russia rose to 55th place out of 187 countries (but as of yet is still lower than the level of 1990 (Indeks, 2014).

However, in qualitative terms, the convergence of Russia and the West over the last 20 years has been unprecedented in history. The political culture of Russians changed radically in the 1990s and at the present time, in terms of its main indices (the attitude of the electorate toward political freedom, pluralism, the distribution of the electorate along the spectrum of “left” and “right,” a willingness to carry out protests in cases of violation of rights, the deteriorating economic situation, and so on), Russia has drawn closer to Western countries, although it has not become identical with them (Rukavishnikov et al., 1995; Politicheskie kul'tury, 1998; Sravnitel'naya politologiya, 2002: 84–88; Batalov, 1995; Nazarov, 1998; Pivovarov, 1994; Shcherbinina, 1997). And it is logical that this convergence, the main trend in the development of Europe in the 18th to 20th centuries, in recent decades has transformed into globalization on a worldwide scale.

And despite this, a comparison of Russia and the West in 2013 will still find many differences between them. The serious researcher must be aware of the transient character of all ideal-typical constructions and regularly redesign them in accordance with ongoing changes. Otherwise the ideal types of “Russia” and “the West” turn into a set of false stereotypes.

### 3.4. Counterfactual Forecasting

The question cannot be avoided: what would Russia be at the present time if imperial modernization had continued? Would the results be greater or less? There are serious grounds for supposing that modernization on the late imperial model would have ensured greater progress.

**First of all,** it was namely the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War that it generated, and not the First World War, that ruined the economy.

Until 1916 (inclusive) the economy quite successfully adapted to the demands of wartime (table 3).
The state of the economy and the standard of living in 1913–1920 (in the USSR’s 1922 borders), 1913 = 100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Industrial Production</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Day, in Hours</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Working Days per Year</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Harvest of Major Crops</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage Carried</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers Carried</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages of Industrial Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Wages of Employees in Industry</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Deposits in Savings Banks****</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Depositors in Savings Banks****</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Mironov, 2017).

The volume of industrial production in the empire during the years 1914–1916, excluding Poland and Finland, grew 22 %, and productivity, 8 %. The agricultural harvest, as before the war, was strongly influenced by the weather. In 1914–1916 it decreased, and in 1916 decreased by 19 % compared with 1909–1913 because of a lower yield, but this was caused by weather, not war. During the 19 % decrease in the harvest, the domestic demand for bread was completely satisfied on a national scale, since in 1914 the state forbade the distillation and export of grain, which had consumed 24 % of the net grain harvest in 1909–1913. Between 1914 and 1916, livestock increased by 29 %. Rail transport satisfactorily coped with the increased loads. When compared with 1914, in 1916 the railway transported 52 % more cargo and 30 % more passengers; the commercial speed of freight trains along the whole network increased from 14 to 16 versts per hour.

The overthrow of the monarchy fundamentally changed the economic situation, and after the October Revolution it deteriorated rapidly and dramatically. The volume of industrial production in 1917 fell by 43 %, in 1918 by an additional 21 %, and in 1920 comprised only 21 % of the 1913 level. The gross harvest of major field crops in 1917 fell by 25 % compared to 1916, in 1918–1919 were 2.2 times less, and in 1920 it was a quarter of the prewar level. Livestock numbers also waned after 1917 and by the end of 1920 had decreased by a third in comparison with 1916. The transportation of goods by rail fell 1.8-fold just in 1917 alone, and the speed of trains decreased 1.2-fold. In 1920 freight turnover fell 9-fold in comparison with 1913.

Before 1917, the bulk of the population did not experience a fall in living standards. The real income of peasants had increased thanks to satisfactory harvests, decline (due to inflation) of the real tax burden, a lessening of spending on alcohol, the mass sale of horses for the needs of the army, and benefits received from the government by those mobilized (Prokopovich, 1952: 51). According to various estimates, real wages of industrial workers in 1916 were 8–9 % higher than the level of 1913 (Sbornik, 1924: 189–191, 243–244). Bank deposits during the war, until the Bolsheviks destroyed the banking system, increased nominally in all categories of the population to approximately the same degree. In and of itself, the fact of even nominal growth in the number of depositors and the value of savings indicates a growth in income for a significant part of the population. From January 1, 1913, to January 1, 1917, the number of savings banks under the Russian State Bank, in which the lion’s share of the population kept their savings, increased 1.7-fold, bankbooks 1.5-fold, and the amount of deposits 2.7-fold. The number of depositors reached 12.7 million (Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 1922: 130–132; Statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 1915: 92).

After February 1917, as a result of crop failures, the Provisional Government introduced a “bread monopoly” in April (the transfer of the entire volume of the grain produced to the state after the deduction of established norms of consumption for personal and farm uses), and peasant incomes began to decline. The real wages of workers went down under the influence of tremendous inflation and in 1920 fell to a third of the prewar level.

A number of economists (P. Gregory, S. Guriev et al., A. Markevich and M. Harrison, etc.) have come to the conclusion that the revolution and the civil war it generated not only ruined the Russian economy, but also slowed economic growth in the future (Gregori, 2003: 76, 82; Markevich, Harrison, 2013;...
Cheremukhin et al., 2013; Cheremukhin et al., 2015; Maddison, 2010). “We have collected all the data currently available on the economic development of Russia and the Soviet Union and have used only recent methods of macroeconomic modeling of structural transformations. It is the combination of new data and new methods of research that allow us to collectively evaluate different scenarios of ‘alternative history’ and to compare them with that actually happened” (Cheremukhin et al., 2013). It is highly probable that without the revolution and the civil war, Russia’s GDP in 1913–1928 would have grown at least in accordance with the Russian prewar trend in the years 1883–1913 (3.3% per year). Then by 1929 we would not simply have reached the level of 1913, but would have surpassed it by 1.6 times, and in 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War, by 2.3 times, at a time when it actually grew 1.6-fold (Gregori, 2003: 76). “Adopting an administrative-command system,” says P. Gregory, “the USSR sacrificed economic growth” (Gregori, 2003: 82).

Secondly. The revolution not only weakened the economy; it spawned a general crisis, social unrest, and civil war, and led the country to political and economic isolation. Before the war Russia was one of the most attractive countries in the world for foreign investment. In the period from 1880 to 1913 the share of foreign capital of the total amount of new investment in industry was about 50 percent. In 1915 foreign capital accounted for approximately 38% of Russian equity, with the majority of the profits derived from it reinvested (Ol’, 1922: 8; Heller, 1998: 55; McKay, 1970: 26–28). After the revolution and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, foreign capital moved out of Soviet Russia for the long term.

The revolution intensified antagonisms in society and created enormous social tensions, as evidenced by a change in the level of deviant behavior, which is usually taken as an indicator of social welfare. In 1914–1916 crime fell by almost 29%, suicide by almost half. In 1919–1921, the level of criminality was 2.4 times higher than in 1911–1913, and approximately 3.6 times greater than in 1914–1916 (Sbornik, 1924: 66–70). In 1914–1917 the suicide rate was, approximately halved when compared with 1913, and from 1918 began to grow; in 1922 it exceeded the prewar level (Tarnovskii, 1926: 192–193). The revolution stole Russia’s military victory. Without the revolution Russia would have undoubtedly been among the victors of the First World War. The allies achieved victory eight months after Soviet Russia’s conclusion of the separate and humiliating Brest peace treaty with Germany on March 3, 1918. With Russia’s participation, the defeat of Germany and her allies would have come sooner. The economic potential destroyed by the revolution and civil war would have been preserved, and the collapse of the empire would have at least been suspended, insofar as Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and part of Belorussia and the Caucasus were seized from Russia by the Brest treaty.

Thirdly. The chief factor of modernization—human capital—would have been more powerful without the revolution and civil war of 1917 to 1920. The loss of population from 1917 to 1928 (as a result of revolution and civil war, famine and epidemics in 1921–22, and emigration) was colossal. It is estimated at 20 million people. The intellectual and artistic elite dominated the ranks of the emigrants. Entire steamships full of intellectuals, called “Philosopher’s Ships,” were dispatched abroad. The passengers of two ships sent from Russia to Germany in 1922 included 45 doctors, 41 professors and teachers, 30 economists, agronomists, and cooperative members, 22 writers, 16 lawyers, 12 engineers, 9 political figures, 2 religious figures, and 34 students, for a total of 225 people.

Fourthly. Soviet people dwelt under the strong, and at times total, control of the state. Private property, the free market, and personal success were negative concepts. Signs of the enslavement of labor could be seen in various productive organizations like kolkhozes, sovkhozes and state-owned enterprises—particularly in kolkhozes. Paternalistic statehood was restored, and state power was sacralized. As a result, Soviet modernization was incomplete, since the people were not able to realize their creative possibilities and abilities. Allow me to remind you about the widespread misconception that the forced labor of millions of prisoners allegedly brought society and the state huge dividends. In fact, the labor of prisoners was not cost effective. The same people in conditions of free labor would have brought incomparably more benefit to society.

3.5. A Comparative Analysis of Imperial, Soviet, and Post-Soviet Modernization

The strategies of imperial and Soviet modernization have much in common. They proceeded under the influence of the domestic needs of Russian society and had a primarily endogenous character. In this process, the state and the elite were the main actors; as a rule, they knew more, saw further, and in the majority of cases understood the needs of society and the national interests of the country better than the people. The state’s prominent role in the process of modernization compensated not only for the lack of initiative on the part of the population, which often did not understand the need for reforms and did not want to carry them out, but also for the shortage of capital, education, and culture. It is characteristic that until the middle of the 19th century, because of the paucity and weakness of the crown bureaucracy, the participation of the government in the everyday workings of the population was insignificant—the country was undergoverned and the pressure of taxation was relatively weak. This was comfortable for citizens, but the pace of social development was slow. When the tsarist bureaucracy strengthened quantitatively and qualitatively in the era of the Great Reforms the present dirigisme began and an increase in the tempo of economic growth to the maximum on a European scale occurred. The government’s role in conducting Soviet modernization increased even more. The level of dirigisme is reflected to a certain extent in the number of officials per thousand of population: in 1698 it was 0.36; in 1857, 1.66; in 1911–1914, 1.47; in 1928, 6.9; in
1950, 10.2; in 1985, 8.7; and in 2010, 7.0 (Mironov, 2018b: 431, 440). However, the directors of Soviet modernization had significant shortcomings—they overestimated the possibilities of the state and underestimated the significance of cultural and ethnoconfessional traditions and they did not take into account the costs and victims of change. In the first post-Soviet decade dirigisme weakened and the quality of governance declined, and this was one of the principal reasons for the economic and political crisis. In subsequent years the role of the government strengthened and at the same time the pace of development increased.

As a rule, the imperial government (with the exception of Peter the Great’s reign) used a strategy of gradual and progressive systemic reforms and coherent intermediate institutions, which ensured management of the reform process and the society’s gradual assimilation of the new institutions created by the reforms. The Great Reforms of the 1860s are a typical example. All the new institutions (in the sense of norms and standardized models of behavior and rules of interaction in decision-making) needed for the successful development of the reforms were created gradually, with a view to the West, but taking into account Russian specifics. To reduce the likelihood of institutional dysfunction, the government used the strategy of creating sequential intermediate institutions, gradually linking the beginning and ideal final design in several stages. For example, it began establishing the institution of the private ownership of land among the peasants with the preservation of existing communal property, which it then transformed into personal and then finally into private land. The transition of the peasantry from the norms of customary law, for example, from collective to individual responsibility, from interest-free loans to interest-bearing loans, and so on, proceeded in several stages. The democratization of society began with local governance, which was seen as a preliminary phase in the transition to parliamentarism. When selecting a new institution, the state carefully chose the country that would serve as a model. As a result of this strategy, it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that liberal legislation on entrepreneurial activities developed that was suitable to Russian economic realities, and that the enduring institution of ownership, without which successful economic development is impossible, was established. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a constitution was adopted, which created a representative institution, thanks to which Russia turned into a dualistic constitutional monarchy. This strategy of successive intermediate institutions combined the advantages of the “cultivation” and “design” of new institutions, and made it possible to manage the pace of institution-building and prevent its rejection (Polterovich, 2008). Those who directed Soviet and post-Soviet modernization preferred a strategy of shock reforms, and did not leave off in the face of heavy casualties. A typical example is the Gaidar reforms of the early 1990s, carried out as a shock treatment, without careful preparation or foresight as to the consequences of the reform, and which spun out of control. The new institutions Gaidar introduced were incompatible with cultural traditions and with the existing institutional structure, because of which either their atrophy, rebirth, or rejection occurred as the result of the activation of alternative institutions, or institutional conflict or the paradox of transfer, when the donor benefits at the expense of the recipient during the transfer of more efficient technology. Consequently, the foundations of the modern market economy, which were laid down in 1992–1998, were not the result of comprehensive, integrated measures, rigorously carried out according to a plan outlined in advance. They were the result of opportunistic changes carried out in conditions of constant crisis, under time pressure and anticipated and unanticipated problems; only the striving to create a market economy conveyed the integrity of the reforms. Hence the incompleteness of the reforms, and a broad strata of the population’s disappointment in democracy, trial by jury, parliament, and the market (Gudkov, 2011).

The strategy used to carry out the reforms affected their results. In the 1860s the GDP decreased by a very approximate estimate of 4 percent, in the 1870s by another 1 percent, solely as a result of a decrease in agricultural production per capita (Gregori, 2003: 22–23, 232–237). Transport, services, and the financial sector saw progress, and industry experienced a significant increase in production due to the ongoing industrial revolution (Liashchenko, 1956: 92–93, 101–104). In the 1860s, the real wages of agricultural workers grew by approximately 65 percent, although in industry (judging by St. Petersburg) it decreased by 13 percent (Mironov, 2012a: 512, 523; Mironov, 2012b: 300–328). The cost of shock therapy in post-Soviet Russia was much higher: according to data from Rosstat, Russia’s real GDP decreased by 22 percent from 1990 to 1995, real per capita income in the 1990s dropped by more than half, and only returned to 1991 levels in 2006, and in 2009 exceeded them only by 19 percent. Rapid economic growth ensued ten years after the reforms, both in post-Reform and post-Soviet Russia. However, in the empire it continued for 56 years, until the First World War, or more exactly to the 1917 revolution, and in post-Soviet Russia for approximately ten years, after which the economy entered a state of recession or stagnation. However, the political, cultural, and social rapprochement between Russia and the West over the last twenty years is historically unprecedented. And this is natural—convergence has been the main trend in European development from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, and in recent decades it has transformed into worldwide globalization.

In my opinion, accusations that the imperial authorities delayed carrying out reforms are unfounded. The crown began reform only when it became absolutely necessary and carried it out in a therapeutic way. This strategy should be acknowledged as a reasonable one in a country where the demands of the small (if not to say microscopic) privileged stratum seriously and sometimes fundamentally diverged from those of the conservative popular masses who made up 95 percent of the population. For oppositionists, it is easy to
demand the most radical, cutting-edge reforms and shift responsibility for the consequences onto the government. However, it should be remembered that when the opponents of the monarchy came to power in February 1917 and carried out only part of the reforms they had proposed, it led the country to complete collapse and civil war. Now many researchers acknowledge that it was hardly worth it to hurry to overthrow of the monarchy in February 1917, and the same is true of the construction of a new socialist society that would be capable of satisfying everyone and making them happy in October of the same year.

The influence of archaic (traditional) structures and institutions. The constant balancing act between tradition and modernity was a peculiarity of both imperial and Soviet modernization. This was caused largely by the potent presence of archaic (traditional) structures and institutions in Soviet society. During the imperial period, these structures and institutions offered significant resistance to the modernization processes that took place along a trajectory representing the resulting force of two vectors—Russian tradition and Western modernism. The traditional vector was based on the experience of Muscovite Rus’ and had numerous supporters, mainly in the village and in the lower strata of society. The pro-Western vector was based at first on the experience of Western European countries, and then also on Russia’s own experience of Westernization and modernization, and had its social base mainly in the city and among the elites and the privileged segments of the population. Thanks to this, there were three possible options for development: traditional Russian, pro-Western, and a combination of the two (since these variations might be very diverse, the variants might in fact be more than three, but we are abstracting from this for simplicity’s sake). At any given moment one was realized, and the two others went, as it were, underground. The vectors of development alternated, with the European option dominating. In this process, the main actor of modernization was the crown, which until 1905 was autocratic and exercised primarily traditional-charismatic rule, based on faith in the legitimacy, sanctity, and God-given character (“bogoustanovlennost”) of the existing order and power since ancient times and on the charisma of the emperor (on belief in his exceptional qualities and on personal loyalty to him by virtue of faith and an oath of allegiance). But laws issuing from the emperor also played an important role in governance, and therefore rule was also legal. Thus during the period of empire the crown was at once traditional, charismatic, and legal, but the ratio of elements changed after 1905 in favor of legality, and therefore rationality. And although the vector of the development of statehood in the period of empire consisted of strengthening legal rule (an important feature of political modernity), power and the rule undertaken by it contained significant archaic elements that affected the content and pace of modernization.

In the Soviet period, both vectors of modernization—the traditional and the modern—continued to exist. The dominance implemented by the Bolsheviks also retained a traditional-charismatic character in many ways, since the top leaders of the country were themselves charismatic leaders. The regime was sacralized. The people largely preserved the traditional collective ideas that even before the revolution might have acted as factors of serious sociocultural restraint on the process of modernization. But the Bolsheviks, relying particularly on the archaism of mass consciousness and using traditional-charismatic methods of rule understandable to the masses, directed the anti-modernist energy of the masses toward Soviet modernization—toward the realization of the utopian project of the construction of Communist society. This also assured both outstanding achievements of modernization and the incomplete realization of the ideal liberal project of European modernization. Many of the most important tasks of ideal European modernization were nonetheless completed by the end of the Soviet period, and archaism in family, social, and political relations had been largely overcome. Russia had risen to the level of modernity in the principal aspects of social life. The vast majority of the population wanted to live in modern society, even including those who had not yet reached the level of modernity in their individual development. Because of this society in the post-Soviet period was able to return to the liberal project without regressing and to complete modernization. The fact that in the post-Soviet period the majority of the population did not desire the restoration of the Soviet political system is evidence of this (Predpochtitel’ nye modeli, 2017). The percentage of those nostalgic for the Soviet past has fluctuated by year, from 24 percent in 2008 to 48 percent in 2003, with an average for 1992–2016 of 38 percent (46 percent in 2017).

It is impossible to ignore the fact that the presence of archaisms in mental, social, and economic structures gave rise to antimodernist sentiments, which from time to time enveloped Russian society. The revolution of 1917 is a characteristic example. It was not limited to the destruction of the remnants of the old regime, as occurred during the revolutions in Europe in 1789 to 1848; it also destroyed the structure of the new society that it had erected and it became anti-modernist in many ways. The majority of peasants participated in the revolution in the name of the restoration of the traditional pillars of public life that had been violated by accelerated modernization. Three factors contributed to the fact that the October Revolution became in some respects anti-modernist: world war, the retention of social institutions, laws, and mentalities of a traditional type among the majority of the Russian peasantry and workers, and the multi-ethnic character of the Russian empire. The revolution was accomplished by four slogans: land to the peasants, factories to the workers, peace to the peoples, and power to the toilers. The most important among

---

1 According to surveys conducted by the Levada Center in 1992–2006 using a representative all-Russian sample of the urban and rural population. The statistical margin of error for this data does not exceed 3.4 percent.
them was the call for the general expropriation of property and its redistribution between workers of the city and the village who were joined in communes, artels, and other similar associations. The cessation of war and the overthrow of the existing authorities played an assisting role—it was necessary to remove these two obstacles, which impeded the expropriation of property. The main social slogans of the revolution are none other than a call to the “Black [General, or Universal—B.M.] Repartition.” The traditional peasant principle found expression in these slogans—“the land belongs to those who work it” was modified in the new conditions to “the property belongs to the toilers.” Participants in the revolution were indifferent to the fundamental principles of the bourgeois social order. And this is not accidental: the majority of people took part in the revolution in order to restore the traditional bases of public life that had been trampled by accelerated modernization. “The Russian Revolution is hostile to culture, it wants to return to the natural state of the people’s life, in which is seen immediate truth and goodness,” stated N. A. Berdiaev (Berdiaev, 1991: 283; Moussnier, 1970: 305–48).1 The anti-modernist character of the October Revolution is clearly manifested in the fact that in 1917–1918 the people deliberately burned down hundreds of museums and thousands of landowners’ estates, and also books, notes, musical instruments, works of art, bed linen, tapestries, porcelain—everything that symbolized European culture and reminded them of the nobility. In both the villages and the cities these actions had a symbolic character: the destruction of the remains of the “accursed past,” the liberation of their environment from “alien elements.” A special term was invented to describe the process of destroying carved and fashioned images of tsars and generals of the past, imperial regalia and emblems, buildings and names—“deromanovizatsiia” (Staits, 1994: 373–374). The destruction of cultural assets during the revolution resembled the destruction of machines and sometimes even whole factories by the Luddites during the Industrial Revolution in England between 1760 and 1820; workers protested in this way against the onset of the industrial era and wanted to return to the past (Bailey, 1998). Anti-modernist sentiments were observed in the broad masses of the population both in the Soviet and the post-Soviet period.

The specifics of Russian modernization. As Russian and global experience shows, national specificity does in principle constrain modernization, but it does not invalidate general laws. On the whole, Russia modernized according to the general European model, but with important particularities conditioned by initial circumstances, the geopolitical situation, natural resources, general cultural opportunities for development and the presence of substantial elements of archaism in society (Nureev, Latov, 2007). However, in my opinion, the idea of a path of development for Russia that resembled no other greatly exaggerates our particularity and leads to a dead end—it denies the very possibility of modernization as a process alien to Russian traditions (Inozemtsev, 2008). A hypertrophied emphasis on Russian specificity perplexes not only many Russians, but also non-Russians (Pain, 2008) and in the end is fraught with an artificial separation of Russia from greater Europe and its self-isolation. In the winter of 2014 I read a handwritten poster:

“Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone, No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness: She stands alone, unique—In Russia, one can only believe.”—Russian poet Tiutchev

“In Soviet modernization the wager on the collective will, the concentration of forces and means, the willingness to sacrifice personal for the sake of public interests bore fruit in the long term. However, economic success continued until the resources of collectivism, communalism, centralism, planning, and popular enthusiasm were exhausted. As they became exhausted the pace of development slowed and ultimately stagnation and then crisis ensued. Something similar can be observed in Japan. Until the 1990s the distinctiveness of Japanese culture did not create an insurmountable obstacle either to economic progress or to political progress. However, Japanese collectivism, which over the course of several decades was an important factor in the development of the Japanese economy, had turned by the beginning of the 20th century from an advantage into a disadvantage. This primarily concerns the institution of lifelong employment (an employee cannot be dismissed unless he commits a serious criminal offense), which, according to economists, has become an important factor in the long-term stagnation of the economy. The crisis of the famous Japanese auto company Nissan clearly demonstrates this. In the middle of the 1990s, it began to experience great difficulties as a result of which its controlling stake was sold to the French company Renault and the French top manager, Carlos Ghosn, was put in charge and given carte blanche. He did what none of his Japanese colleagues could have dreamed of doing—he closed several unprofitable factories and fired their staff. Two years later the company had become profitable again, and Ghosn became a national hero of Japan. His success has influenced the policies of other companies. The Soviet leadership’s refusal to modernize politically and to some extent socially had negative consequences in the long-term—the enormous economic and political challenges that the country faced in the post-Soviet period were largely attributable to this refusal. Social scientist Karl Popper warned

1 The peasant movement in France in the 17th century pursued the same goal—to return to a more ancient social order.
politicians: “Arresting political change is not the remedy; it cannot bring happiness. We can never return to the alleged innocence and beauty of the closed [collectivist—B.M.] society.” Our dream of heaven cannot be realized on earth… The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism, the more surely do we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticized gangsterism… there is only one way, the way into the open society. We must go on into the unknown, the uncertain and insecure, using what reason we may have to plan as well as we can for both security and freedom” (Popper, 1994: 189).

The question of the particular features of imperial and Soviet modernization is debatable and has an extensive historiography (Gavrov, 2010; Golubev, 2012; Opyt, 2000; Rodriges et al., 2008; Rossiiskaya modernizatsiya, 2008; Seniavskii, 2013; Travin, Margariya, 2004). I will dwell only on some of the common assessments that I have doubts about or that appear to be inaccurate.

The dating of Russian modernization is uncertain largely because many works use the term “modernization” in several senses at once and without explanation. This devalues an important term and confuses the analysis. For example, K. V. Samokhin begins Russian modernization with Peter I, who because of the Northern War allegedly began to “transition the empire from an agrarian society to an industrial one.” The war, in his opinion, predetermined the formation of elements of a market economy; laid the foundations for processes of social mobility and the urbanization of Russian society; effected a change in values, primarily in the nobility; and created conditions for the formation of the rule of law and civil society. E. M. Skvortsova holds a similar position. In this case, the authors have in mind modernization in the sense of the advance of society through reforms, the introduction of innovations, and through overcoming underdevelopment, but calls this the transition from agrarian to industrial society and from traditional to modern society. However, as we know, the industrial revolution—an essential driver of modernization in Europe—began not in Russia, but in Great Britain, only in the last third of the eighteenth century. With reference to Russia in the 18th century, we can speak only of the establishment of the preconditions for the industrial revolution and for the transition from agrarian to industrial society (Samokhin, 2012; Skvortsova, 2014).

In the view of many researchers, authoritarian, overbureaucratized government inhibited or prevented modernization (Volkogonova, 2008; Krzhevov, 2008). Shevelev argues that “the system of authoritarianism, based on the ‘paternalistic model,’ the paramilitary structure of society and state power, and the mobilizational model of development constantly reproduced themselves on Russian soil. At the same time, alas, the values of freedom and human dignity have always remained in the background” (Shevelev, 2009). As my analysis has shown, the state was the leader of modernization, but for a long time during the imperial period weak (not strong!) administrative capability did not allow competent management of the process. It is wrong to think that dirigisme is always harmful—it is a question of its quality, of the power of civil society and the culture of the population. In the imperial and Soviet periods a strong state and skillful dirigisme often served as engines of modernization. The history of European countries in modern and contemporary times provides analogous examples of successful transformations precisely under strong authoritarian regimes that exercise competent management. For example, in France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, the royal authorities carried out successful reforms, but periods of democracy appeared to be connected to catastrophic inflation and to the beginning of destructive processes in the economy (the era of the French Revolution; Germany after the First World War; Austria, Hungary, and Poland after the fall of the Habsburg monarchy). Events developed similarly in Spain, Portugal, and the countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia (Travin, Margariya, 2004). Perhaps the more important question is not who should govern society—the bureaucracy, the middle class, the proletariat, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, etc.—but what is the best method to ensure the common good?

The tradition of intense dirigisme weakens when the general and political culture of the population reaches a high level, and civil society grows strong. The extent and degree of state intervention in people’s lives is inversely proportional to the power of civil society. But the strength of the latter is not proportional to the number of the middle and upper classes; it depends decisively on their social and political activity. In 1905–1917, both classes together made up about 5–7 percent of the entire population of the empire, but they created an influential civil society, thanks to which the post-reform period was distinguished by a strengthening of the role of public organizations. In 1905, society achieved a constitution, a parliament, and legislative participation, and in February 1917 overthrew the monarchy and instituted a democratic republic. In contemporary Russia the share of the middle class in the population of the country (according to various estimates) is 3 to 4 times higher, however, conversely, its influence and activity is weaker than 100 years ago. The absence of social activity is replaced where necessary by the activities of agents of the state, and the power of society by the power of state structures. But a danger arises here, which few manage to avoid—any public or state organization, in the absence of comprehensive supervision by the citizenry, inexorably, in accordance with Robert Michels’s “iron law of oligarchy,” transforms into an unwieldy, corrupt machine that serves the interests of a narrow circle of people, and is oblivious to the people and their needs (Michels, 2006; Michels, 1999). The excessive power of the state ultimately becomes the cause of decline and decay

---

1 “Magical, tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society, and the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decision, the open society... the transition from the closed to the open society can be described as one of the deepest revolutions through which mankind has passed” (Popper, 1994: 165, 167).
both of itself and of the society that is governs. “The state devours the living body of the nation,” and the people are transformed into fuel to feed the state machine. Stalinist authoritarianism serves as an example of this (Ortega-i-Gasset, 2003: 118).

In recent years, the thesis about the mobilizational model of development has gained popularity: almost since the emergence of the Russian state and to the end of the Soviet period, development ostensibly occurred through the over-concentration of the modest resources available to the state, the over-exploitation of the population, and the excess pressure of the state apparatus and all elements of society in its entirety. The mobilizing type of the development of society exerted influence on all spheres of life, including economic development and the population and the formation of the elite (Gaman-Golutvina, 2006: 17–40; Mobilizationnaya model′, 2012). In view of the small size of the bureaucracy and the underdevelopment of infrastructure, the mobilizing model seems to me inadequate to Russian reality in the Muscovite and imperial periods, although it is probably consistent with the nature of Russia’s development in the 1920s–1950s. How could Peter I have compelled the population to work in a mobilization regime in the presence of 4,500 officials, with underdeveloped infrastructure, without a telephone or telegraph, and with a literacy rate of 2 percent in the village and 8–9 percent in the city!? (Mironov, 2018b: 423–490).

The popular idea of the oscillating, inverse character of the process of Russian modernization also raises serious doubt. Advocates of this point of view suggest that for 300 years now the country has alternated between short-term liberal thaws and long-term conservative frosts, and that reforms are always followed by so-called counter-reforms that effectively abolish the results of the reforms. Some scholars consider this kind of running in circles to be “recurrent modernization” (Naumova, 2004; Filatov, 2006). In fact, counter-reforms have not cancelled out reforms, but have either corrected or reduced the pace of the changes, or have delayed their implementation for a certain period of time. In my opinion, we should be talking about the cyclical rather than the recurring nature of reform. If Russia had developed according to the algorithm “forward—backward” or “reform—counter-reform” (I′l’in et al., 1996; Pantin, 2006: 333–398; Rozov, 2006), then Russia would have been a backward autocracy, running in place. Meanwhile, the country was developing rapidly in every way. The change in the state’s course from liberal to conservative did not mean the revival of that which was abolished by the reforms. Structural reforms carried out in the liberal periods of transformation were generally irreversible; the government rarely discarded them. The fact that progress occurred with zigzags and delays, and sometimes even with deviations, is normal for any European country, where counterrevolutions always followed revolution. The matter was complicated in Russia by the fact that the state moved ahead of society, carrying out reforms that outran society’s ability to assimilate them, and overcoming the opposition of potent elements of archaism present in society and the government. This led to the fact that it was often necessary to stop or retreat to wait until society had adjusted to the reforms. But the process of reform always resumed with new strength from the point at which it halted. What should we call this progress—linear, parabolic, rhythmic, dualistic, inverse, cyclical? I prefer to talk about a normal and organic process. It is normal, because normal development consists namely of alternating phases of recovery and decline, flourishing and crisis. It is organic, because although the state ran ahead of society, it acted in accordance with its interests and emerging trends, which it noticed more quickly and sooner than society did.

In Western democratic countries, the alternation of liberal and conservative government policy with adjustment of the reforms of predecessors who had been in power was also the norm. For example, in Great Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Tories, then the Whigs, alternately came to power, and in the course of two centuries a constant rivalry was maintained between them. An analogous battle between the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States occurred in the second half of the 19th and the 20th centuries (Sogrin et al., 1991: 182–207; Shlezinger, 1992: 41–77). However, it never even comes to mind to speak of reforms and counter-reforms or about recurrent modernization in relation to these countries. I would also note: in Western European countries the transition to modernity occurred with particular intensity from 1770 to 1870, moreover, up to 1848 an acute battle took place between the old and the new; only since 1870 has the process of modernization become irreversible and only in the course of the first half of the 20th century has it been completed, and then only in its broad outline, in the majority of countries of the contemporary European Union (Gillis, 1983: 9–16).

Many researchers emphasize the forcible and elitist nature of imperial modernization, in which the people are mute and submit to the reforms only from necessity and weakness (Seniavskii, 2013). The management of the process of modernization by the government does not mean that society was no more than the object of dirigisme. Quiet and massive resistance was able to block reforms when they did not have support among a sufficiently wide stratum of the population, as was active intervention, with weapons in their hands. This is evidenced by the failure of Petrine reforms to change the people’s way of life according to a Western European model, due to a complete lack of response from them. In order for reforms that were unpopular with the people to enter into practice, they had to be based, if not on the majority, then at least on a significant part of the population. The Stolypin reform is an example of this—the state managed to initiate it because of the support of a third of the peasantry.

The liberal imperial modernization project was quite successfully implemented in the post-Reform period by the efforts of the state and the elite, despite the resistance of a majority of peasants and workers, but only as long as the state maintained control over its implementation. When the state lost control during
the revolution of 1917 and the dictatorship of the masses ensued, or as Ortega-i-Gasset puts it, “the triumph of hyperdemocracy, during which the mass acts directly, imposing its desires and tastes outside of the law and through brute pressure” (Ortega-i-Gasset, 2003: 47). First the monarchy, and then also the Provisional Government, having failed at democratic reforms, were swept away together with their liberal projects. The latter was replaced by a conservative socialist project because it harmonized both with the deep collective ideas of the people and a large part of the intelligentsia, and also with the attitudes and desires of the broad masses at that time. This made it possible to continue modernization in its Soviet variant. In turn, the Soviet project—after it exhausted itself—was replaced by a new liberal project, particularly thanks to popular support.

Thus, in the period of revolutionary upsurge, the counter-elite supported, stimulated, and exploited the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, but the people also used the counter-elite to achieve their goals. Even when the people were silent, they were not bit players, because they used the weapons of the weak—everyday resistance in the form of petty sabotage, theft, damage to property, spreading gossip and anecdotes about the authorities, and so on. A similar type of resistance to the powers that be is always present in authoritarian systems, when mass public protest is difficult or impossible due to fact that the discontented lack the resources necessary for an open struggle. Routine resistance is an effective form of struggle that deters the authorities from abuse and under favorable circumstances becomes the basis for collective mobilization (Scott, 1985; Scott, 1993). Well aware of the strength of the resistance of the silent masses, institutionalists consider frontal shock reform as unpromising, because the institutions rooted in society that are supported by the silent majority paralyze the reforms. To reduce institutional dysfunction, economists proposed a strategy of successive intermediate institutions in several stages connecting their initial and intended design.

I categorically disagree with the assertion that imperial and Soviet modernization turned out to be disastrous, because it ended in complete collapse and revolution. S. N. Gavrov tries to demonstrate that “our historical misfortune lies in the fact that Russian modernization facilitated not so much Russia’s entry into modernity as a strengthening of the feudal-imperial foundations of the cultural-civilizational system” (Gavrov, 2010). T. M. Bratchenko and A. S. Seniavskii suggest that “the imperial model failed historically, having been terminated by the outbreak of revolution” (Bratchenko, Seniavskii, 2004). “Both models led to the collapse of the existing systems (the imperial “from the bottom,” as a result of revolution; the Soviet from the top, as a result of the dismantling and of actualizing the conflictive potential of society)” (Seniavskii, 2013). The revolutionary termination of some kind of project is not proof of its failure. All institutions and structures are subject to moral attrition with time, but they cannot change voluntarily and spontaneously, since existing within them are inherent relationships that prevent the flexible adaptation of society to changing conditions—these are called embedded constraints. As a general rule, the effect of these constraints is overcome during the course of reforms “from above.” A society that has entered an epoch of transformation in the institutional system becomes socially unstable and enters a place of risk: a peaceful, evolutionary path is always long, painful, and contradictory. When it ends, society leaves the zone of risk. If it does not, then a revolution occurs, which forcibly destroys the embedded constraints that interfere with adaptation, and thus opens the way for the adoption of a new institutional system (Starodubrovskaia, Mau, 2004: 27–50, 65–68, 417–446). In this way, social crisis can be a disorder of growth and testify to its development. This understanding of crisis specifically corresponds to the state of Russian society at the end of the 19th to the early 20th centuries, or Soviet society in the 1980s.

Even less convincing is the notion of the country’s fundamental inability to modernize in the classic European sense (Inozemstev, 2008: 164–165). In fact, the economy, society, and state progressively developed in the 18th through 20th centuries, although more than once war and social unrest interrupted the process. As a result, Russia organically entered the world political and economic system on equal terms, and we have every reason to argue for a three-century hypercycle in the country’s development.1 But when speaking about the vitality of Russian modernization projects it is necessary to clearly realize that “the historical path is not the pavement on Nevskii Prospect; it travels entirely through the fields, those that are dusty, that are dirty, those that run through the swamps and through the thickets” (Chernyshevskii, 1950: 922–923). In Russia as everywhere else, the rapid pace and success of modernization created new contradictions, engendered unprecedented problems, and triggered temporary and local crises, which in unfavorable circumstances escalated into revolutions, but with prudence from the ruling class might have been successfully resolved. The revolutions of the twentieth century might be considered a byproduct of successful modernization.

A contrast between imperial and Soviet modernization is doubtful. For example, well-known researcher of modernization processes A. S. Seniavskii clearly holds this idea: The specificity of modernization allows us to speak of two qualitatively different models—the imperial (liberal-conservative) and the Soviet (ideological, partocratic, etatist, paternalist, mobilizing). The prerevolutionary model was Westernized and elitist (divorced from its socio-cultural bases) and reactive to long-simmering problems (it reacted very belatedly, under pressure from external threats); a majority of the population supported

1 This thesis is thoroughly argued in my book Rossiiskaia imperiia: Ot traditsii k moderny [The Russian Empire: From tradition to modernity].
Soviet modernization, which employed a long-term strategy that outstripped others until the 1970s and wielded historic initiative across the globe. The Soviet model managed to be regenerated from mobilization and social consolidation in a conservative, inhibited development that provoked social tension” (Seniavskii, 2013).

Imperial modernization was also ideological (though non-Marxist), since all its actors openly supported a certain ideology; paternalistic (which I think requires no comment), and statist (built on dirigisme). It was also partocratic in its own way, in that partocracy means “a political system in which the supreme political state power (legislative, executive, and judicial) is in fact concentrated in the hands of the only party integrated into the state system, or more precisely—in the hands of the party bureaucracy” (Slovar’, 2013: 272). The crown bureaucracy (as the state apparatus of administration was called, which was subordinate to the monarch and bound to him through an oath of allegiance) approached the Communist party bureaucracy in its organization and style of management, to a large extent until 1905 and to some degree until 1917.

Imperial modernization was not elitist. It embraced the educated strata, the upper strata, a significant part of the urban population and the part of the peasantry that supported the Stolypin reform. The enumerated parts of the population partially intersected, so their percentage of the total population is unlikely to exceed 30 to 35 percent—which is, of course, more than the elite. But needless to say the impact of Soviet modernization turned out to be more profound and comprehensive—it reached the whole of society. At a time when imperial modernization barely touched the lion’s share of the population who lived mainly in the village, a significant part of the population encountered the principal processes of modernization either negatively (for example, commercialization, social and material bourgeois differentiation) or with indifference. Soviet modernization embraced all of society. However, at certain stages of Soviet modernization the authorities broke away from their social and cultural base, because the tasks and goals it set were not shared by a significant part of the population. And in its essence it was also reactive and “Westernizing,” because the slogan “Catch up and overtake the West” did not leave the agenda of socialist construction and remained relevant until the end of the Soviet regime. However, I agree with Seniavskii that both modernizations were similar in terms of goals, means, and the conditions of carrying them out.

4. Conclusion

Soviet modernization was a continuation of imperial modernization in terms of goals, means, results, and the circumstances in which they took place. But it probably provided a less rapid tempo of development and cost society more than late imperial modernization. The fact that Soviet modernization replaced imperial modernization after the wartime revolution of 1917, and post-Soviet modernization replaced its Soviet counterpart after the peaceful revolution of 1991–1993 does not mean that neither modernization succeed, nor does it mean that both suffered collapse. In terms of their economic results, imperial and Soviet modernization were on the whole quite successful projects, although they also did not tackle all the tasks and expectations assigned to them. A rapprochement between Russia and the West occurred thanks to modernization, as did a reduction in the level of cultural and economic development. Post-Soviet modernization also did not resolve all of the old problems and at the same time created many new ones. But it is far from complete and rendering a verdict on it is premature. Nevertheless, it is already possible to say that the political, cultural, and social rapprochement with the West over the last 20 years has been unprecedented in history. And this is natural: convergence had been the main trend in the development of Europe from the 18th to the 20th centuries, and in recent decades has transformed into worldwide globalization.

Authoritarian power (autocracy or Soviet authoritarianism) is compatible with progress, at least at a certain stage of the country’s development. It is not necessary to demonize the authoritarian style of governance, which in reality has certain advantages. In the contemporary management of all countries it is used along with two others—the democratic and liberal. Global experience shows that all of these have advantages and disadvantages; their effectiveness is conditioned by circumstances and the cultural-psychological profile of those who participate in governance.

The autocratic style of management, when power is concentrated in the hands of one person, ensures higher productivity but a lower level of job satisfaction than then democratic style. The authoritarian style is warranted in groups whose members have lower material and spiritual needs, who are satisfied with the minimum, who don’t want or do not like to work and who will avoid work whenever possible. It is also appropriate in situations that are similar to extreme or crisis situations. In the paternalistic version of the style, when the leader acts from the position of “I am the father,” the concentration of power in his hands is combined with care for subordinates and a feeling of responsibility for the conditions of their present and future existence.

The democratic style is focused on the person and allows subordinates to take part in the drafting of management decisions and to define their own goals in accordance with those that the leader formulates. This style relies on initiative and has the goal of increasing productivity by means of increasing job satisfaction. However, the democratic style does not lead to the growth of satisfaction and efficiency of labor in cases where ordinary workers do not have developed material and spiritual needs, and are basically satisfied with how their work is compensated. Employee participation in management has a positive effect on
the job satisfaction and effectiveness only of those who take part in that management. Ordinary workers, as a rule, are indifferent to this opportunity.

The liberal style offers workers full independence and the possibility of individual and collective creativity. This style is effective only in teams where the workers have a high level of knowledge, competence, and responsibility, where they have elevated demands, love creativity, and in addition are capable of self-control and self-discipline. Liberal leadership is fraught with unpredictable situations and conflicts in intra-team relations, as well as a state of uncertainty and lack of commitment among workers, and as a result of this, low labor productivity. At the current time this style of management is used almost exclusively in scientific, design, and creative organizations.

In 1917 in European Russian the proportion of literate people aged ten and older amounted to 43 percent, people with a secondary education 3.5 percent, and people with a higher education 0.5 percent. In 1939 those numbers were 88 percent, 1.2 percent, and 14.1 percent, respectively (Mironov, 1991; Mironov 2012a: 587). During the imperial period the needs of the peasants and proletariat were low and therefore served as a poor stimulus to high labor productivity. If we rely on Maslow’s so-called hierarchy of needs, then they correspond to the first three levels. As a reminder, this hierarchical model divides human needs into five ascending levels: (1) physiological (hunger, thirst, sexual attraction, and so on); (2) security (comfort, stability of living conditions); (3) social (social ties, communication, attachment, care for others and attention to oneself); (4) prestige (self-respect, respect from others, recognition, achievement of success and high esteem, professional growth); (5) spiritual (cognition, aesthetics, self-actualization, self-expression, self-identification). It is believed that a person experiences needs of a high level after low-level needs have been at least partially met, and that needs depend on education, upbringing, and the outlook of the person (Makklelland, 2007: 55–92). A subsistence work ethic corresponds to a low level of needs. Its adherents did not consider it necessary to work to the full extent of their powers every day, but only in extraordinary circumstances, and even in moments of labor enthusiasm they would not work efficiently due to a lack of qualifications, knowledge, diligence, initiative, and basic discipline. The subsistence work ethic was a common European phenomenon in the preindustrial era, and the reason for this was not the climate, nor the natural environment, but the mentality inherent to man in traditional society (Mironov, 2001; Mironov, 2016).

A transformation of the subsistence work ethic into the Protestant, or bourgeois ethic began in post-Reform Russian as a result of the growth of needs, but the process was far from complete by 1917. In Soviet times, the growth of needs and the formation of a new labor morality continued. The socialist attitude toward labor, which in many of its aspects converged with the bourgeois ethic, was strongly instilled into three generations of Soviet people. A set of specific measures developed for stimulating labor (shock workers, socialist competition, cost accounting, self-enforcement, the Stakhanovite movement, and so on) (Mukhin, 2003: 296–330). The educational level among workers of all social groups increased significantly. As a result of this, by the end of the Soviet era the worker morale of Russian citizens had progressed in the direction of the bourgeois model (Zaslavskaja, Ryykina, 1991: 148–181). A comparative study of the attitude toward labor of Russian and German workers at the beginning of the 1990s showed that an instrumental type of attitude toward work (as only a way to earn) was typical for 43 percent of Russian and 24 percent of German workers; a terminal attitude (as the meaning of life) corresponded to 24 and 44 percent, respectively, and a mixed attitude accounted for 31 and 35 percent. Further growth in instrumental attitudes toward labor occurred in the post-Soviet era. According to data from VTsIOM for the year 2000, 70 percent answered the question “what does work mean for a person” with the response: “work is first of all a source of livelihood” (Temnitskii, 2005).

It turns out that in the imperial and also in the early Soviet and Stalin period (in the latter two periods because of the mobilizing nature of modernization, among other things) the authoritarian style of management proved optimal to achieve maximum labor efficiency and to ensure the common good. This supposition is confirmed by the fact that during imperial and Soviet Russia the vast majority of the population preferred the authoritarian style in its paternalistic version.

In the late Soviet period, from the second half of the 1950s through the 1980s, as needs, culture, and education grew, the demand for an authoritarian style of government began to decrease. According to an all-Russian sociological poll of the Levada Center, carried out in February 1992, to the question of which economic system seemed to them more correct (one that is based on state planning and distribution or one that is based on private property and market relations), only 29 percent voted in favor of the planned system, and 48 percent in favor of the market system. Accordingly, around 30 percent of the respondents supported the Soviet political system. However, the reforms, which according to the opinion of the majority of the population were unsuccessful, led to a change of mindset. According to a Levada Center poll from February 2016, the majority again prefers the authoritarian style. To the same question (which economic system seems more correct to you?) 52 percent spoke out in favor of state planning and distribution (Sorok shest’ protsentov, 2017). According to another Levada Center survey conducted in January 2017, over the last sixteen years the percentage of Russians who sympathize with Stalin has reached a historic high, with

1 According to surveys by the Levada Center conducted with a representative all-Russian sample of the urban and rural population. The statistical error of the data does not exceed 3.4 percent.
“admiration,” “respect,” and “sympathy” for Stalin applying to up to 46 percent of respondents (eleven years ago, in March 2006, this was 37 percent) (Predpochtitel’nye modeli, 2017).

Thus, paradoxically, if you follow the democratic principle, then in contemporary Russia the authorities should use a non-democratic, authoritarian style of governance. When a political system and style of governance that do not correspond to the traditions and the desires of the majority of the populace are imposed on the people, what happens is well known. I am not an adept of the authoritarian style of governance, but it is necessary to face facts and to reckon with them. The first wave of modernization, in the most developed countries, occurred spontaneously, as a process of self-organization and self-development, of which large socially complex societies are capable under the influence of changing conditions of life and geopolitical factors (Markaryan, 1983: 158). They had to invent, by trial and error, to search for new institutions and structures, new ways. Countries in the second wave of modernization had the opportunity to take advantage of the achievements of those that had led the first wave. However, they also needed the creativity of the followers. The modernization of each large country took place according to a particular scenario, because to actually borrow the structures and institutions of the advanced countries was ineffective or even destructive, since in every society there is a certain preliminary conditionality associated with its structure (institutions), according to which the actors of society select from a variety of institutions (cultures) that exist in the environment by means of trial and error, which is universal for all—“from the amoeba to Einstein” (Popper, 2000).

It is necessary to change that which society is largely ready for, and not with shock reforms, but by a therapeutic route. Sprinting ahead and a mania for modernization and reform revealed its ineffectiveness particularly noticeably after the Second World War in developing countries, causing devastating consequences. Here is one typical example. In the 1970s, soon after the end of the American Vietnam War, it was discovered that the mountain Khmer—a large tribe at the stage of Paleolithic culture who had lived in the lands of South Vietnam for thousands of years, had disappeared. It was suggested that the Americans had utterly destroyed them. However, an international scientific expedition, established to clarify the circumstances of their deaths, ascertained that the mountain Khmer destroyed themselves after American rifles fell into their hands. These primitive hunters, abandoning the bow and arrow, had within a few years destroyed the fauna and shot each other, and the survivors descended from the mountains and assimilated into an alien socio-cultural environment. An explosive mix of modern Western technology and ancient national traditions and customs led to the disappearance of this ethnic group. It is interesting that anthropologists who were part of the expedition and had observed similar episodes in Asia, Africa, America, and Australia helped to figure out this sad story. The Russian and world experience of modernization is convincing evidence of the correctness of those who propose a rational combination of universalism and particularism.

Does modernization make a person happier? Opinions differ. One camp (Emile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, and many other philosophers and sociologists) believe that it does not, since modernization does not automatically lead to the growth of overall happiness. Social and political evolution occur according to a pattern, from sovereign monarchy to disciplinary society, and from this to a society of total control, which effectively deprives a person of freedom and manipulates him by means of mass media. This makes people unhappy (Foucault, 1999; Foucault, 2005; Deleuze, 2004: 215–33; Baudrillard, 2000a; Baudrillard, 2000b). Others answer the question positively and as an argument refer to a list of happy countries according to the World Happiness index, compiled by the UN. In 2015, for the third year in a row, Switzerland was in the lead. It was followed by Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Canada. Togo, Burundi, Benin, Rwanda and Syria closed the list of 158 countries, with Russia in the 64th place. Shkuratov writes: “I have no objections to the assertion that people in Switzerland feel more satisfied with life than people in Rwanda and Syria.” So, the author carefully asserts the idea that there is a link between the level of modernization and the level of satisfaction with life (Shkuratov, 2016). However, in my opinion, this argument is incorrect. One ought not to compare contemporary countries with one another, but one and the same country in various periods: it is not correct to compare Burundi or Togo in 2015 with Switzerland in 2015, but it is to compare them with Burundi or Togo in 1915, 1815, and 1715; Switzerland of 2015 with Switzerland of 1915, 1815, and 1715; Russia of 2015 with Russia of 1915, 1815, and 1715. Because Burundi in 2015 is nothing like what Switzerland was 100, 200, or 300 years ago, as the latent critic suggests. In this case the result will be different. I have little doubt that 200 to 300 years ago the tribes who lived on the lands of present-day Burundi or Togo were in their self-perception happier than those who are living now, precisely because at that time there was little modernization or it had simply not affected them. And now the peoples of these countries are unhappier than others namely because they are engulfed in a modernization that destroys their traditional way of life and does not sufficiently compensate for it.

The theory of modernization in relation to Russia is not outdated, as some colleagues think (Buldakov, 2014). First, they criticize the early concept of modernization of 1950–1960. Meanwhile, this concept has undergone a long course of development. Theorists of neomodernization revised such fundamental characteristics of the process of modernization as irreversibility, progressivity, duration, evolutionism, unilinearity, regularity, and randomness, which were postulated by the classicists. Thanks to this, the modernization concept makes it possible to examine and correspondingly to analyze society as a real, living,
heterogeneous, and multilayered agent of history, which responds variably to the challenges of the environment.

Secondly, Russia has not yet fully reached the level of modernity and to compare its development with that of other European countries is not very original. For the time being, no one has proven that the development of society can support movement in any other direction than from traditional agrarian society to urban, industrial, contemporary society while avoiding modernization. The presence of a trend to increase the freedom of the individual has also not been refuted. The theory still manages to explain the development of the country in the last three centuries quite well (Seniavskii, 2013). This does not mean, of course, that it will permanently be the height of scientific thought. There is a demand for new approaches, and they are being proposed, but they do not yet constitute serious competition for the theory of modernization. It is possible to speak about the moral obsolescence of the theory in relation to modern postindustrial (information) societies or contemporary underdeveloped countries because the first tackled the tasks of modernization and moved to a new level of development, and the second are not early versions of modern society, but are as if suspended in their development, preserving their national characteristics and structures. The theory of dependence or the theory of dependent development better characterizes their development. In the context of globalization and neocolonialism, underdeveloped states occupy a dependent position in the global economic system. Their economic backwardness and political instability is a consequence of their integration into the global economy and systematic pressure from developed powers that perpetuate their underdevelopment, blocking their attempts to free themselves from dependence and start on the path of true modernization, using various methods—monopolization of markets, economic influence (through finance, patents for technology and so on) and sanctions, as well as direct intervention, both political (in the media, education, culture, etc.) and military. As a result, developing countries of the “periphery” become poorer, their resources, capital, and educated workforce flowing into the rich countries of the “center,” and because of this they have little chance of truly modernizing. A few states have been able to escape this fate—Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. The motive for the blocking strategy is obvious—underdeveloped countries provide developed countries with natural resources, cheap labor, and markets for distribution, without which the latter would not have been able to support the high standard of living of their populations (Semenov, 2003).

There are different scenarios for further development. Proponents of the civilizational paradigm predict that Russia, like all underdeveloped countries, may become a victim of globalization, since the liberal international strives to destroy the civilizational identity of Russia and subordinate it to the dictates of the United States and others like it (Panarin, 1999). Followers of the World-Systems paradigm predict the emergence of a new order. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein is convinced that the bourgeois world system is in crisis, on the threshold of a shift that might lead to the genesis of a completely new world order (Wallerstein, 2003). Advocates of the theory of modernization for the future of Russia see capitalism with a human face along Russia’s path (Brittan, 1998: 358–383). Those who support the idea of Russia’s unique development believe that the West is in a state of general crisis and therefore can no longer serve as a model for emulation. Russia should find its own path, based on its own traditions. Centrists propose structuring Russia on the basis of a combination of liberalism and “a Russian cultural-civilizational type of development” (Alekseeva et al., 1994; Erasov, 1995).

Institutionalists have proposed the concept of path dependence, or dependence on previous development, or the dependence of future development on the path already traversed. Each country has its own historical path and as a rule does not abandon it. Objective analysis shows that over the course of its thousand-year history Russia has undoubtedly developed as a European country. Global factors of the social evolution of society, at least after the adoption of Christianity, were shared by Russian and other Europeans. Russian national traditions and values fall within the framework of European traditions and values. All Russian public institutions, by which modern institutionalism means formal and informal rules and constraints structuring the interaction of persons and institutions, were in essence European. In Russia there was not a single institution that would not have been found in any European country. In the period of the empire, in Soviet and post-Soviet times, Russia and other European countries developed on particularly close trajectories. Westernization of the country often became state policy. The European vector of its movement and its convergence with the West were and still are evident. Based on the concept of path dependence and taking the European vector of Russian development as a proven fact, one can say with very high probability that Russia, as a European country, had a common future with the rest of Europe; its immediate future will be determined by the European trajectory of development, but this trajectory will also depend on Russia.

5. Acknowledgements
This research was supported by grant N 15-18-00119 from Russian Science Foundation.

References


Indeks, 2014 — Indeks [Index] // URL: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C8%ED%E4%E5%EA%F1 (data obrashcheniya [date of access]: 25.08.2014). [in Russian]


Kakaya politicheskaya Sistema, 2016 — Kakaya politicheskaya sistema kazhetsya vam luchshei: sovetskaya, synesshnya sistema ili demokratiya po obraztsu Western countries? [What political system you think is best: Soviet, the current system or democracy modeled on Western countries] 17.02.2016 // URL: http://www.levada.ru/2016/02/17/predpochtitelnye-modeli-ekonomicheskoj-i-politicheskoj-sistemy/ (date of access: 17.06.2017) [in Russian]


Имперская, советская и постсоветская модернизации

Борис Николаевич Миронов

Аннотация. В России имперского и советского периодов общество развивалось от традиции к модерну, в результате возникли передовые индустриальные технологии, а также соответствующие им политические, культурные, социальные механизмы, позволяющие указанные технологии поддерживать, использовать и управлять ими. Имперская модернизация проходила по классическому европейскому сценарию. По целям, средствам и результатам советская модернизация явилась ее продолжением. Однако в одних аспектах (формирование рациональной, образованной, светской ориентированной личности, индустриализации, урбанизации, демократизации семьи, эмансипации женщин и детей) советская модернизация напоминала, а в других – отличалась от классической западной модели (приоритет государства над обществом, примат коллектива над личностью, ограничение свободы индивидуума, централизация, планирование). В кратком виде формула советской модернизации сводилась к технологическому и материальному прогрессу на основе традиционных социальных институтов. Советская модернизация обеспечила менее высокие темпы развития и обойшла обществу более дорогой ценой, чем имперская. Однако, если бы не огромные и ничем не оправданные человеческие жертвы, советскую модернизацию можно было бы считать успешной, хотя она так же, как и имперская, закончилась кризисом и революцией. То, что советская модернизация сменила имперскую в результате военной революции 1917 г., а постсоветская сменила советскую после мирной революции 1991—1993 гг., не означает, что обе модернизации не состоялись и не потерпели крах.

Имперская модернизация охватила в большей степени образованные слои, верхние страты, значительную долю городского населения и часть крестьянства, которая поддержала Столыпинскую реформу. Перечисленные группы населения частично пересекались, поэтому их процент в общей численности населения в ряд превышал 30-35. Львиюю долю населения, проживавшего преимущественно в деревне, модернизация затронула слабо, причем значительная ее часть встретила принципиальные модернизационные процессы либо негативно (например, коммерциализация, социальную и имущественную буржуазную дифференциацию), либо индифферентно. Советская модернизация охватила весь социум, и ее воздействие оказалось более глубоким и всесторонним. По своим результатам обе модернизации можно считать в целом достаточно успешными проектами, хотя они и не решили всех возлагавшихся на них задач и надежд.

В постсоветский период общество смогло вернуться к либеральному проекту без возможности рецедива и завершить модернизацию. Постсоветская модернизация далека от завершения и выносит ей вердикт преждевременно. Однако уже можно сказать, что в политическом, общественном и социальном отношении сближение России и Запада за последние 20 лет было беспрецедентным для всю историю. И это закономерно: конвергенция – главная тенденция развития Европы XVIII-XX вв., в последние десятилетия трансформировалась в глобализацию мирового масштаба.

Ключевые слова: модернизация имперская и советская, модели и стратегии проведения, сходство и различия, критика оценок модернизации, конвергенция России и Запада, российская колея.

Translated by Marlyn Miller, Brandeis University

* Корреспондирующий автор
Adresa электронной почты: mironov1942@yandex.ru (Б.Н. Миронов)